{"id":450,"date":"2026-04-19T16:52:41","date_gmt":"2026-04-19T16:52:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.deepdigitalventures.com\/?p=450"},"modified":"2026-04-24T08:27:51","modified_gmt":"2026-04-24T08:27:51","slug":"troubled-debt-restructurings-tdrs-what-they-are-and-why-they-quietly-matter","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/troubled-debt-restructurings-tdrs-what-they-are-and-why-they-quietly-matter\/","title":{"rendered":"Troubled Debt Restructurings (TDRs): What They Are and Why They Quietly Matter"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A troubled debt restructuring (TDR) was a loan workout for a borrower already in financial difficulty. In plain English, it meant the bank changed the loan&#8217;s terms, often by lowering the rate, extending the maturity, deferring payments, or forgiving principal, because the borrower needed help staying current. TDRs mattered because they showed where credit stress was being managed before losses became obvious.<\/p><p><strong>Important regulatory update:<\/strong> <strong>ASU 2022-02<\/strong> eliminated TDR recognition and measurement guidance for creditors that have adopted CECL, the current expected credit losses model used to estimate expected loan losses. For calendar-year CECL adopters, the change took effect in <strong>Q1 2023<\/strong>. Banks no longer report TDRs as a distinct category; the disclosure has been replaced with <strong>loan modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty<\/strong>, reported by modification type.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-2'>[2]<\/a><\/sup> The concepts in this article remain useful as a framework for reading successor disclosures, but readers should not expect to find a TDR field in any Call Report, the quarterly regulatory filing banks submit, after the bank&#8217;s CECL adoption date.<sup><a href='#source-2'>[2]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup> The <a href='#successor-disclosure'>successor framework section below<\/a> explains what replaced it and which analytical signals still apply.<\/p><p>Before that accounting change, troubled debt restructurings rarely made headlines on their own. They tended to show up in regulatory schedules, footnotes, and credit-quality tables rather than splashy press releases. That low profile was exactly why they mattered: TDR activity was one of the quieter ways to spot stress in a loan book before charge-offs, nonaccrual balances, or capital pressure became more visible. The successor disclosure keeps much of that signal by separating modifications by type instead of rolling them into one legacy label.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><p>At a practical level, old TDR and new modification disclosures answer similar questions. Has a borrower become financially stressed? Did the bank change the contract because of that stress? And is the modified loan actually performing afterward? For the borrower, a concession can be a lifeline. For analysts, investors, and bank managers, it is also a signal that credit stress is being managed rather than eliminated.<\/p><p>That is why this concept deserves more attention than it usually gets. Modifications are not automatically a red flag, and they are not always large enough to drive a full-bank conclusion. But they can reveal where underwriting is weakening, where borrower conditions are deteriorating, and where banks may be smoothing a credit problem that could become more costly later. In Banking Intelligence, the useful workflow is to start with <a href='https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/'>Modifications<\/a> and then move into the relevant <a href='https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/'>bank profile<\/a> for reserves, delinquencies, capital, and source context.<\/p><h2 id='successor-disclosure'>Are TDRs Still Reported? What Replaced Them Under ASU 2022-02<\/h2><p>For banks that have adopted CECL, standalone TDR reporting is gone. ASU 2022-02 removed creditor TDR recognition and measurement guidance and replaced the old disclosure emphasis with modifications made to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-2'>[2]<\/a><\/sup> The reportable modification types are:<\/p><ul><li><strong>Interest-rate reduction<\/strong> &#8211; the modification lowers the contractual rate below what would be offered to a non-distressed borrower.<\/li><li><strong>Term extension<\/strong> &#8211; the maturity is lengthened to reduce near-term cash flow pressure.<\/li><li><strong>Principal forgiveness<\/strong> &#8211; a portion of principal is written off as part of the modification.<\/li><li><strong>Other-than-insignificant payment delay<\/strong> &#8211; payments are deferred for a material period.<\/li><li><strong>Combinations<\/strong> &#8211; any mix of the above, which can be revealing because multiple concessions may indicate the borrower needed more than one form of relief.<\/li><\/ul><h3>Old TDR vs. Post-ASU 2022-02 Disclosure<\/h3><table><thead><tr><th>Question<\/th><th>Old TDR framework<\/th><th>Post-ASU 2022-02 disclosure<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>What is being identified?<\/td><td>A loan to a borrower in financial difficulty where the lender granted a concession.<\/td><td>A loan modification to a borrower experiencing financial difficulty, grouped by modification type.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Where does it show up?<\/td><td>Pre-adoption Call Report TDR memorandum items.<\/td><td>Current Call Report modification items in Schedule RC-C or Schedule RC-N, depending on performance.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>How long is it tracked?<\/td><td>The legacy TDR label followed the old accounting and reporting model.<\/td><td>Current Call Report instructions focus on modifications that occurred in the previous 12 months.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><p>That shift makes the old and new series related, but not interchangeable.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><p>Modified loans are not just a one-quarter disclosure. Current FFIEC Call Report instructions tell banks to report loan modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty that occurred in the previous <strong>12 months<\/strong>, with performing modifications in Schedule RC-C and past-due or nonaccrual modified loans in Schedule RC-N.<sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup> Nonaccrual simply means the bank has stopped accruing interest income because collection is uncertain. The leading follow-up question is the <strong>modification redefault rate<\/strong>: the share of modified loans that become 90 or more days past due, move to nonaccrual, or otherwise stop performing under the modified terms. I would avoid treating any single percentage as a universal danger line; the better signal is whether redefaults are rising alongside charge-offs, nonaccruals, or reserve builds.<\/p><h3>Can You Compare Pre-2023 TDRs with Post-2023 Modification Data?<\/h3><p>Not directly. A time series built across the 2022-2023 boundary will show an artificial break because ASU 2022-02 changed both the accounting label and the reporting items.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-2'>[2]<\/a><\/sup> The analytical intuition from older TDR analysis still applies, but the data pipeline needs to be rebuilt around the new Call Report fields for modified loans to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty.<sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><p>One further discontinuity has to sit alongside the 2023 one. The <strong>CARES Act Section 4013<\/strong> carve-out applied to eligible COVID-19-related loan modifications made from <strong>March 1, 2020<\/strong> through the earlier of <strong>January 1, 2022<\/strong> or 60 days after the end of the COVID-19 national emergency. For eligible loans, financial institutions could suspend TDR treatment and did not have to report those modifications as TDRs in regulatory reports.<sup><a href='#source-4'>[4]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-5'>[5]<\/a><\/sup> Any trend analysis spanning 2020-2022 has to account for it. The period&#8217;s reported TDR balances can be understated relative to an ordinary credit cycle, and a year-over-year comparison that treats the 2020 baseline as normal can overstate the subsequent rise.<\/p><h2>Key Takeaways<\/h2><ul><li>A troubled debt restructuring was a loan modification granted to a borrower in financial difficulty on terms the lender would not normally offer.<\/li><li>For CECL adopters, TDRs are no longer reported as a standalone category; they were replaced by disclosures for loan modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty.<\/li><li>These disclosures matter because they can reveal borrower stress before losses fully show up in charge-offs or nonperforming loan ratios.<\/li><li>Extensions, rate reductions, payment deferrals, and principal forgiveness can reduce immediate stress while also delaying full recognition of credit weakness.<\/li><li>The best way to interpret TDRs and successor modification data is alongside delinquency, nonaccrual, charge-off, reserve, and capital data rather than in isolation.<\/li><\/ul><h2>What Is a Troubled Debt Restructuring?<\/h2><p>A troubled debt restructuring was not just any loan modification. Banks modify loans all the time for ordinary commercial reasons. Under the legacy TDR framework, the borrower had to be in financial difficulty and the bank had to grant a concession it would not have granted under normal conditions.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><p>In plain English, that means the bank was adjusting the loan because the borrower was having trouble, not because the borrower was a strong customer negotiating a better deal from a position of strength. The lender was trying to improve the odds of repayment, avoid a worse loss, or buy time for the borrower to recover.<\/p><p>Common TDR concessions, and the similar modification types now disclosed under ASU 2022-02, include:<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><ul><li>Lowering the interest rate below market terms<\/li><li>Extending the maturity or amortization schedule<\/li><li>Deferring principal or interest payments<\/li><li>Reducing the principal balance<\/li><li>Changing repayment terms in a way that eases near-term cash flow pressure<\/li><\/ul><p>Not every restructured loan was a TDR, and not every TDR ended badly. Some borrowers recovered, resumed normal payments, and never became a large loss problem. But the fact that the lender had to step in with a concession still told you something important about borrower health and portfolio risk.<\/p><h2>Why TDRs Quietly Matter<\/h2><p>TDRs mattered because they often sat in the middle of the credit deterioration chain. A bank might first see softening borrower cash flow, covenant stress, weaker collateral performance, or delinquency creep. Then the loan was modified. Only later, if the workout failed, the loan might move into nonaccrual, charge-off, foreclosure, or a larger reserve build.<\/p><p>That sequencing is why TDRs could be valuable for anyone trying to read bank risk early. They showed where management was already intervening. In some cases, that was a sign of prudent workout discipline. In others, it suggested that a credit problem was being deferred rather than resolved.<\/p><p>TDRs were especially useful when they were concentrated. If one institution suddenly showed rising modifications in commercial real estate, agricultural lending, construction, office exposure, or small-business credits, that could tell you more than a broad bank-wide ratio alone. Stress often starts in pockets before it becomes obvious in the top-line numbers.<\/p><h2>Why Banks Use TDRs<\/h2><p>From the bank&#8217;s perspective, a troubled restructuring could be a rational response to a difficult credit. Forcing immediate default was not always the best economic answer. If a borrower had a viable business, temporary cash flow problems, or collateral that still supported a workout, modifying the loan could preserve more value than accelerating loss recognition right away.<\/p><p>Banks used restructurings for several practical reasons:<\/p><ul><li>To improve the probability of repayment<\/li><li>To avoid a foreclosure or liquidation that would create a larger loss<\/li><li>To stabilize a borrower through a temporary disruption<\/li><li>To buy time while collateral values or operating conditions improve<\/li><li>To manage risk more efficiently than through immediate charge-off<\/li><\/ul><p>That did not make TDRs bad accounting or disguised failure by default. In many cases, they were a normal part of credit workout practice. The analytical challenge was deciding whether the restructuring reflected sound loss mitigation or a growing need to support borrowers who could no longer perform on original terms.<\/p><h2>What TDRs Can Reveal About a Bank<\/h2><p>TDR data could tell you several things if you knew where to look. The useful question was not just whether the number was up or down, but what kind of stress it pointed toward.<\/p><h3>1. Borrower Stress Beneath the Surface<\/h3><p>A bank could still show decent headline profitability and manageable charge-offs while quietly increasing modified loans. That could indicate that credit problems were present even if they had not yet hit earnings in full.<\/p><h3>2. Portfolio Concentration Risk<\/h3><p>If TDRs were concentrated in one category such as office, construction, hospitality, agriculture, or consumer lending, that could reveal where the institution was most exposed to cyclical weakness.<\/p><h3>3. Workout Quality and Risk Appetite<\/h3><p>Some banks restructured early and aggressively to preserve value. Others delayed recognition longer than they should. A rising TDR balance was not enough by itself; you also wanted to know whether modified loans were performing afterward or rolling into worse outcomes.<\/p><h3>4. Reserve and Capital Pressure<\/h3><p>If restructurings kept climbing and performance on modified loans weakened, banks could need larger allowance builds, which could pressure earnings and eventually capital.<\/p><h3>5. Management Posture<\/h3><p>TDRs could also hint at management style. Conservative institutions might identify stress quickly and work credits early. More aggressive institutions might stretch modifications too long. The number alone did not settle that question, but it could point you where to investigate.<\/p><h2>What TDRs Do Not Tell You on Their Own<\/h2><p>TDRs are useful, but incomplete. A low TDR balance did not prove a portfolio was clean, just as a higher TDR figure did not prove disaster was coming. Banks differed in business mix, workout culture, borrower type, and disclosure thresholds. Some stress showed up first in delinquencies, some in nonaccrual, some in reserves, and some in restructurings.<\/p><p>TDR data also did not tell you whether the modified loans were likely to cure, whether collateral remained strong, how much of the exposure was reserved, or how many concessions were minor versus severe. That is why TDRs worked best as part of a broader credit-quality review.<\/p><h2>How to Analyze TDRs the Right Way<\/h2><p>If you want to use TDRs or successor modification data seriously, focus on direction, concentration, and follow-through rather than just the absolute number.<\/p><ul><li><strong>Trend:<\/strong> Are modified loans rising quarter over quarter or year over year?<\/li><li><strong>Mix:<\/strong> Which loan categories are driving the changes?<\/li><li><strong>Performance:<\/strong> Are modified loans staying current or redefaulting?<\/li><li><strong>Linkages:<\/strong> Do higher modifications line up with rising delinquencies, nonaccruals, or charge-offs?<\/li><li><strong>Reserves:<\/strong> Is the allowance building in step with the stress?<\/li><li><strong>Capital:<\/strong> Does the bank have enough cushion if modified credits deteriorate further?<\/li><\/ul><p>This is where workflow matters. A modifications screen is only useful if it can be paired with delinquency, funding, reserves, and bank-level context. Banking Intelligence keeps the source trail close while users move from the <a href='https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/'>loan-modifications view<\/a> into related bank and comparison pages.<\/p><h2>Why TDRs Matter More in Certain Loan Categories<\/h2><p>Not all loans behave the same way under stress. TDRs tended to be especially informative in portfolios where repayment depended heavily on cash flow, refinancing conditions, or collateral values. Commercial real estate is the obvious example. If landlords, developers, or investors needed extensions and concessions in a weak market, restructuring activity could be an early sign that repayment assumptions were softening.<\/p><p>The same logic can apply to small-business loans, agricultural exposures, leveraged commercial credits, and certain consumer segments. In each case, the restructuring may reduce short-term pain while preserving uncertainty about the final outcome. The more concentrated the portfolio, the more informative modification activity becomes.<\/p><h2>How Banking Intelligence Helps Put TDRs in Context<\/h2><p>TDR analysis is most useful when it is not isolated. Banking Intelligence connects restructuring and modification data to broader bank condition analysis. Users can review institution-level context on <a href='https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/'>Banks<\/a>, compare names side by side on <a href='https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/'>Compare<\/a>, and review source coverage and caveats on <a href='https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/'>Data<\/a>. That matters because TDRs are a look-closer metric, not a complete verdict.<\/p><p>A bank with elevated restructurings but strong reserves, stable capital, and improving modified-loan performance may be managing stress well. Another bank with rising modifications, worsening delinquencies, and funding pressure may deserve a much harder look. The workflow difference is what turns a disclosure item into a useful analytical signal.<\/p><p>Troubled debt restructurings quietly mattered because they sat close to the real decision point in credit risk. Their successor disclosures still show where banks are making concessions to borrowers under stress, which often means pressure is present even if the final loss has not arrived. That does not make every modification a warning siren. It does make the pattern worth monitoring.<\/p><p>The best way to read them is with discipline. Ask whether restructurings or successor modifications are rising, where they are concentrated, how modified loans are performing, and whether reserves and capital look strong enough if conditions worsen. Early signals only help when they are checked against the rest of the credit picture.<\/p><h2>FAQ<\/h2><h3>What is a troubled debt restructuring?<\/h3><p>A troubled debt restructuring was a loan modification made for a borrower in financial difficulty where the lender granted a concession it would not normally offer, such as a lower rate, longer maturity, payment deferral, or principal reduction.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><h3>Are TDRs still reported?<\/h3><p>For banks that have adopted CECL, TDRs are no longer reported as a distinct Call Report category. The old TDR reporting was replaced by loan modification disclosures for borrowers experiencing financial difficulty.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-2'>[2]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><h3>What replaced TDRs?<\/h3><p>The successor framework is disclosure of loan modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty, broken out by modification type such as interest-rate reduction, term extension, principal forgiveness, payment delay, or combinations of those concessions.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><h3>Can you compare pre-2023 TDRs with post-2023 modification data?<\/h3><p>Not directly. The 2022-2023 transition created a break in the series because ASU 2022-02 changed the accounting and reporting framework. The old data remains useful for historical context, but post-2023 analysis should use the new modification fields.<sup><a href='#source-1'>[1]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-2'>[2]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href='#source-3'>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><h3>Are TDRs always bad?<\/h3><p>No. A TDR could be a sensible workout tool that improved repayment odds and reduced eventual loss. What mattered was whether modified loans performed well afterward and whether the bank was using restructurings prudently rather than delaying recognition of deeper problems.<\/p><h3>Do rising TDRs mean a bank is unsafe?<\/h3><p>Not automatically. They mean you should look closer. The right follow-up checks are delinquency trends, nonaccruals, charge-offs, reserves, capital, and portfolio concentration.<\/p><h3>Which loan categories make TDRs especially important?<\/h3><p>TDRs were often most informative in commercial real estate, construction, small-business, agricultural, and other cash-flow-sensitive portfolios where refinancing or collateral weakness can create repayment pressure.<\/p><h3>How should readers use TDR data in practice?<\/h3><p>Use legacy TDR data and successor modification data as part of a broader credit-quality review. Trend the balances over time, identify which portfolios are driving changes, and compare restructurings against other credit and capital metrics before drawing conclusions.<\/p><!-- ddv-source-append:start --><h2 class='wp-block-heading'>Sources<\/h2><ol class='wp-block-list'><li id='source-1'>FASB ASU 2022-02, Financial Instruments &#8211; Credit Losses (Topic 326): Troubled Debt Restructurings and Vintage Disclosures &#8211; primary accounting standard eliminating creditor TDR recognition and measurement guidance and adding modification disclosures. URL: <a href='https:\/\/storage.fasb.org\/ASU%202022-02.pdf'>https:\/\/storage.fasb.org\/ASU%202022-02.pdf<\/a><\/li><li id='source-2'>FFIEC Supplemental Instructions for Call Reports, December 2022 &#8211; implementation instructions for ASU 2022-02 and the end of TDR memorandum reporting for adopters. URL: <a href='https:\/\/www.ffiec.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/data\/reporting-forms\/supplemental-instruction-051\/FFIEC031_FFIEC041_FFIEC051_suppinst_202212.pdf'>https:\/\/www.ffiec.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/data\/reporting-forms\/supplemental-instruction-051\/FFIEC031_FFIEC041_FFIEC051_suppinst_202212.pdf<\/a><\/li><li id='source-3'>FFIEC 031 and 041 Call Report Instructions &#8211; Schedule RC-C and RC-N instructions for reporting loan modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty, including the previous-12-month reporting window. URL: <a href='https:\/\/www.ffiec.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/data\/reporting-forms\/FFIEC031_FFIEC041_202512_i.pdf'>https:\/\/www.ffiec.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/data\/reporting-forms\/FFIEC031_FFIEC041_202512_i.pdf<\/a><\/li><li id='source-4'>FDIC FIL-36-2020, Revised Interagency Statement on Loan Modifications by Financial Institutions Working with Customers Affected by the Coronavirus &#8211; agency guidance on Section 4013 and regulatory reporting treatment. URL: <a href='https:\/\/www.fdic.gov\/news\/financial-institution-letters\/2020\/fil20036.html'>https:\/\/www.fdic.gov\/news\/financial-institution-letters\/2020\/fil20036.html<\/a><\/li><li id='source-5'>15 U.S.C. 9051, Temporary relief from troubled debt restructurings &#8211; statutory text for CARES Act Section 4013 as amended, including the applicable period and TDR suspension language. URL: <a href='https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A15+section%3A9051+edition%3Aprelim%29'>https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A15+section%3A9051+edition%3Aprelim%29<\/a><\/li><\/ol><!-- ddv-source-append:end -->","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Troubled debt restructurings, or TDRs, can look like small footnotes in bank disclosures, but they often reveal where borrower stress is building before bigger credit problems become obvious. Here is what TDRs are, why they matter, and how to read them in context.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":1036,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_titles_title":"Troubled Debt Restructurings: What Replaced TDRs?","_seopress_titles_desc":"Plain-English guide to TDRs, why they mattered, what ASU 2022-02 replaced them with, and how to compare legacy TDR data with post-2023 loan modifications.","_seopress_robots_index":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-450","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-regulatory-data"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/450","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=450"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/450\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2126,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/450\/revisions\/2126"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1036"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=450"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=450"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/banking.deepdigitalventures.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=450"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}