Q4 2025 Bank Securities Concentration Screen: Who Needs a Repricing Review?

If you are choosing a sponsor bank, writing a bank-credit note, covering a regional-bank earnings story, or sitting on a small-bank board, this screen answers one practical question: which banks need a securities-book review before you trust the headline capital and liquidity ratios?

Schedule glossary. In Call Report language, RC means the balance sheet, RC-B means securities detail and maturity or repricing buckets, RC-E means deposit detail, RC-O includes deposit-insurance assessment and brokered-deposit data, RI means income, and RC-K means quarterly averages. The article uses the plain-English names below except where a hand check needs the exact schedule label.

Securities concentration is hard to judge from one public ratio because the useful facts sit in different places: the balance sheet shows the size of the book, the securities schedule breaks it out by category and maturity, deposit schedules explain funding, and income schedules help compare yield against funding cost. The public screen below is best used as a concentration and diligence queue before a deeper repricing review.

The Q4 2025 screen uses public data in Deep Digital Ventures Banking and is meant to rank where the securities question should move to the front of diligence. For a hand check, start with the FFIEC Central Data Repository,^[2] then reconcile the bank’s Call Report to the FDIC’s December 2025 FFIEC 031/041 instructions^[3] or the FDIC’s December 2025 FFIEC 051 instructions,^[4] depending on which form the bank files.

Why Securities Exposure Matters

A securities portfolio can be a liquidity reserve, an earnings asset, or collateral for public deposits and borrowings. The risk shows up when securities were bought at low yields, deposits reprice faster than assets, and the bank does not have enough cash or borrowing capacity to avoid selling underwater bonds. Available-for-sale debt securities are reported at fair value on the balance sheet; held-to-maturity securities are reported at amortized cost, with fair value detail in the securities schedule.

The 2023 failures of Silicon Valley Bank on March 10, 2023,^[5] Signature Bank on March 12, 2023,^[6] and First Republic Bank on May 1, 2023^[7] are not analogies for every bank in this table. They are a reminder that securities analysis only matters when it is paired with deposit behavior, liquidity access, and management’s ability to avoid forced sales.

The screen uses three indicators:

• Securities as a percentage of assets. A bank above 25% of assets gets a securities review because the portfolio is no longer a side item; the hand check compares securities with total assets.
• Securities as a percentage of equity. A bank above 300% of equity gets a capital-materiality review because a 10% change in the securities book would equal at least 30% of equity before tax and accounting treatment.
• Liquid assets and funding context. Cash, interest-bearing balances, federal funds sold, deposit mix, and brokered-deposit data decide whether the bank can wait for maturity or repricing.

Examples From the Q4 2025 Screen

The table below keeps the original screen order: banks ranked by securities relative to equity, with securities relative to assets shown beside it. The dollar amounts are screen values from Q4 2025 public data in Deep Digital Ventures Banking; before quoting them outside this article, reconcile the bank’s Call Report facsimile in the FFIEC CDR.^[2]

These are unusual ratios, but they are not all unusual for the same reason. The FDIC reported that longer-term loans and securities were 33.7% of industry assets in Q4 2025, while several banks below show securities alone above 70% of assets.^[1] The top cluster also has a business-model pattern: several are trust, sweep, custody, or wealth-management affiliated banks where the balance sheet can naturally carry more securities and fewer traditional loans. Westamerica is the more conventional commercial-bank comparison point in this excerpt.

Bank	State	Bank type / business model	Assets	Securities	Securities / assets	Securities / equity
Ameriprise Bank, FSB	MN	Wealth-management affiliated bank	$25.31B	$20.22B	79.9%	1278.8%
Principal Bank	IA	Affiliated direct / wealth bank	$9.33B	$5.93B	63.6%	1208.1%
First American Trust, FSB	CA	Trust bank	$6.77B	$5.94B	87.7%	1164.4%
Charles Schwab Trust Bank	TX	Trust / custody-style bank	$10.43B	$8.66B	82.9%	1130.2%
Charles Schwab Premier Bank, SSB	TX	Brokerage-affiliated sweep bank	$27.02B	$19.84B	73.4%	994.3%
Westamerica Bank	CA	Regional / community commercial bank	$5.92B	$4.29B	72.4%	680.8%

Do not read this as a weak-bank list. Read it as a priority list. All six banks shown have securities greater than 600% of equity, and five of the six have securities greater than 70% of assets. That means the securities footnote, maturity schedule, available-for-sale versus held-to-maturity split, and funding profile should be reviewed before relying on a simple capital ratio.

Here is the Ameriprise Bank, FSB worked example from the table: $20.22B of securities divided by $25.31B of assets equals 79.9% securities-to-assets, and $20.22B of securities divided by the 12.788x securities-to-equity ratio implies about $1.58B of equity. In plain English, each $1.00 of equity is supporting about $12.79 of securities, so the next question is not ‘is this bank unsafe?’ but ‘what part of the securities book matures, reprices, or can be funded without a forced sale?’

A counterexample matters here. A trust-style bank with a high securities-to-assets ratio, a short Treasury or agency ladder, modest unrealized losses, stable fiduciary or affiliated deposits, and ample cash could screen high on concentration while still having limited near-term repricing pressure. The screen is designed to tell you where to ask that question, not to answer it by itself.

For this screen, DDV uses 25% securities-to-assets and 300% securities-to-equity as review thresholds, and 50% securities-to-assets or 600% securities-to-equity as priority-review thresholds; these are DDV triage rules calculated from Q4 2025 public Call Report data, not regulatory limits.

Screen result	Interpretation	Next step
Below 25% of assets and below 300% of equity	Securities are probably not the first diligence topic.	Still scan the securities schedule if unrealized losses, liquidity, or deposit pressure is already a concern.
Above 25% of assets or above 300% of equity	The portfolio is material enough to affect earnings sensitivity or capital optics.	Separate available-for-sale, held-to-maturity, pledged securities, and one-year maturity data.
Above 50% of assets or above 600% of equity	The securities book should be a front-page diligence item.	Review one-year and one-to-three-year repricing buckets before approving a sponsor-bank, credit, or investment memo.
Above 1000% of equity	The portfolio is many times the bank’s equity base.	Do not rely on the screen alone; reconcile the balance sheet, securities detail, deposits, income, and average-balance schedules.

The Follow-Up Questions

The first ratio tells you where to look. The follow-up questions tell you whether near-term repricing risk is real:

• What is available-for-sale versus held-to-maturity? A large held-to-maturity book can keep economic rate marks out of the balance-sheet carrying value, while a large available-for-sale book can move through accumulated other comprehensive income.
• How large are the unrealized marks? Compare amortized cost with fair value in the securities schedule, then check whether available-for-sale marks are already flowing through accumulated other comprehensive income.
• What matures or reprices soon? Start with debt securities due in one year or less, then review the one-to-three-year maturity and next-repricing buckets for fixed-rate and floating-rate securities.
• Is the yield still useful after deposit repricing? Compare securities income with average securities balances, then compare that yield with the interest expense on deposits and borrowings.
• How stable is the funding? A high securities-to-equity ratio is more urgent when deposits are rate-sensitive, brokered, uninsured, or operationally concentrated.
• Can the bank raise liquidity without selling underwater securities? Review cash, interest-bearing balances, federal funds sold, pledged securities, and borrowing capacity disclosed outside the basic screen.

Limitations

A high securities-to-equity ratio is a materiality flag, not a safety rating. The Call Report can show available-for-sale versus held-to-maturity, amortized cost versus fair value, one-year maturity data, and the basic funding mix. It does not fully show management’s rate-risk model, hedge documentation, deposit runoff assumptions, contingent liquidity plan, or board-approved interest-rate-risk limits.

The right conclusion is conditional. If a bank has 70% of assets in securities, more than 600% securities-to-equity, limited one-year maturities, heavy rate-sensitive deposits, and weak liquidity outside the securities book, the issue belongs in the first page of the memo. If the same high securities ratio sits beside short maturities, stable funding, ample cash, and credible borrowing access, the risk may be manageable but still needs monitoring.

How to Use the Screen

Use the screen as a work queue. Start with the highest securities-to-equity names, then decide whether the bank needs a full securities review before you move forward.

1. Open the underlying public-data context view and confirm the reporting period, bank name, and source fields for the institution you are reviewing.
2. Put the target bank beside similar institutions in the peer comparison view so you can see whether the securities ratio is unusual for that business model.
3. Download or view the bank’s Call Report in the FFIEC CDR^[2] and reconcile securities, assets, and equity to the screen values.
4. Move to the securities detail and separate available-for-sale, held-to-maturity, pledged securities, one-year maturity, and one-to-three-year maturity or repricing buckets.
5. Bring in deposits and income: deposit detail and brokered-deposit data for funding, income for securities yield and funding cost, and average balances for scale.
6. Write the decision rule in the memo: proceed, monitor, or pause until treasury, liquidity, or management commentary answers the gap.

For fintech founders, the practical use is simple: do not pick a sponsor bank only because the API, compliance team, or pricing looks good. If the bank also shows securities above 50% of assets or 600% of equity, ask how the bank funds that book and whether deposit outflows could force sales. For bank analysts and journalists, the same screen decides which earnings calls deserve questions about maturity buckets, unrealized losses, and funding cost.

FAQ

Where is the near-term repricing data in the Call Report?

Start with the securities maturity and repricing memorandum items. The most useful hand checks are debt securities due in one year or less and the one-to-three-year buckets for fixed-rate and floating-rate securities.

What is missing from the DDV screen?

The screen does not replace the Call Report, audited financials, or management discussion. It does not fully show hedge strategy, deposit runoff assumptions, borrowing capacity, board limits, or whether management would sell available-for-sale or held-to-maturity securities under stress.

Sources

1. FDIC Q4 2025 Quarterly Banking Profile press release and industry context: https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2026/fdic-insured-institutions-reported-return-assets-124-percent-and-net
2. FFIEC Central Data Repository bulk Call Report download: https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/PWS/DownloadBulkData.aspx
3. FDIC December 2025 FFIEC 031/041 Call Report instructions: https://www.fdic.gov/bank-financial-reports/ffiec-reports-condition-and-income-instructions-ffiec-031-and-041-report-3
4. FDIC December 2025 FFIEC 051 Call Report instructions: https://www.fdic.gov/bank-financial-reports/ffiec-reports-condition-and-income-instructions-ffiec-051-report-form-1
5. FDIC failed-bank page for Silicon Valley Bank: https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/silicon-valley.html
6. FDIC failed-bank page for Signature Bank: https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/signature-ny.html
7. FDIC failed-bank page for First Republic Bank: https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/first-republic.html

Continue reading→